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THE TRANSFER OF NONQUALIFIED DEFFERRED
COMPENSATION AND NONSTATUORY STOCK
OPTIONS: The Interaction of the Assignment oflncome
Doctrine and Internal Revenue Code § 1041?
By:
Vincent R. Barrella•

I. INTRODUCTION:

The assignment of income doctrine is one of the oldest
and most consistently applied of all of the common law
doctrines. Its origins clearly demonstrate that the presence or
absence of tax avoidance as a reason for the anticipatory
division of income is not a controlling factor in the doctrine's
application.' So long as the assignor is willing to surrender
part of the "tree" (property) he can assign the "fruit" (income)
produced from that portion of the tree. What generally can not
be done is to assign all or a part of the fruit without transferring
that portion of the tree which produces the fruit. 2 Thus, income
from property can readily be assigned, provided, that the
transferor is willing to transfer to the assignee an interest in the
property producing the income.3
The rules relating to the assignment of income derived
from the rendering of services are much more restrictive. In
that case, the "tree" producing the "fruit" is the person
providing the services. As it is impossible for a taxpayer to
transfer all or part of himself to another person, earned income
can not be assigned from one taxpayer to another unless the
1
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doctrine is overridden or otherwise rendered inapplicable.
Furthermore, the fact that a taxpayer need not render any
additional services in subsequent years (i.e., the income is fully
There are, however,
earned), does not alter that result. 4
judicial and statutory exceptions to the application of the
doctrine. For example, in the domestic relations arena sections
71 (defining alimony) and 215 (allowing a deduction for
alimony paid) effectively override the doctrine.
Property settlements proved to be somewhat trickier in
light of the different state law provisions regarding interests in
property (i.e. , common law v. community property rules). One
of the more nettlesome decisions was the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Davis.5 In 1984, Congress
revamped the rules governing the treatment of alimony. In
addition, it enacted section 1041 to alleviate some of the
problems relating to property settlements. Section 1041
reverses the result in Davis by shifting the incidence of taxation
from the transferor of property to the transferee. 6 Critical to
the operation of section 1041 is a transfer of property.7 In the
case of qualified deferred compensation, Congress provided for
income shifting through the mechanism of a "qualified
domestic relations order," which allows for a former spouse
(the transferee) to be characterized as an "alternative payee."8
There is no parallel provision addressing the consequences of a
transfer of nonqualified deferred compensation incident to a
divorce.

II. REV. RUL. 2002-22
In an effort to fill that void, the Internal Revenue
Service ("Service") issued Rev. Rul. 2002-22 9 wherein it set
forth the position that section 1041 treatment should be
extended to nonqualified deferred compensation and
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nonstatutory stock options. 10 In the context of transfer incident
to a divorce, the Service has effectively put nonstatutory stock
options and nonqualified deferred compensation on par with
statutory options and qualified deferred compensation. While
it is anticipated that the Service's decision will more often than
not produce favorable results, a question lingers as to whether
the Service's position is justified from a purely technical point
of view. For example, in the case of qualified deferred
compensation, the seamless dovetailing with section 1041 is
11
accomplished through other statutory provisions. The desire
to achieve symmetry is admirable; but will the Service's efforts
withstand scrutiny?

(50) percent of the balance in said account and that in the event
that W should die prior to the date of payment of the deferred
compensation, said amount is to be paid to her estate. In 2006,
W receives $200,000 which represents her share of the balance
in H's deferred compensation account at the time of their
divorce.

The linchpin of the Service's effort to extend section
1041 treatment to nonstatutory stock options and nonqualified
deferred compensation through Rev. Rul. 2002-22 is the
characterization of the transferor's interest in both as property.
Once the Service concluded that these interests constituted
property, it followed that section 1041 could apply to a transfer
of either incident to a divorce. 12 Regardless of whether the
Service should have moved away from its original position
regarding the primacy of the assignment of income doctrine,
the ruling provides some significant opportunities for the
transferor spouse and places an additional burden on the
transferee spouse. For example, a taxpayer who is entitled to a
significant future payment for previously provided services can
avoid the limitations applicable to the deductibility of alimony
by structuring the payout as a transfer of his right to the
13
nonqualified deferred compensation.
The impact of Rev. Rul. 2002-22 can be illustrated by
the following. Assume that at the time of their divorce, H has a
vested interest in an unfunded and unsecured nonqualified
deferred compensation account. Assume further that under the
terms of their 2002 divorce decree W is entitled to receive fifty

Prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 2002-22, H would
have recognized $400,000 of income from deferred
compensation in 2006, but would have retained only $200,000
since W would have received one-half of the $400,000. H
would not be entitled to an alimony deduction pursuant to
section 215, because the payment to W would not meet the
section 71 definition of alimony. 14 Absent characterization as
alimony, the payment would be in the nature of a property
settlement. Neither H nor W would recognize any gain on the
transfer of the $200,000. 15 If we assume that H is taxed at the
rate of thirty (30) percent on his receipt of the $400,000, the
applicable tax liability would be $120,000 leaving him with
only $80,000 (or approximately 29% of the after tax payment)
while W ends up with $200,000 (or approximately 71% of the
after tax payment). 16
If under the terms of the divorce decree, the payment
would not have survived W's death, and none of the other
limitations on the characterization of the payment as alimony
were applicable, 17 H may still suffer adverse consequences.
For example, if H resides in a state that imposes a tax on gross
income he would not derive any benefit from the alimony
deduction. Consequently, he would be subject to tax on the
full $400,000. If W resided in the same state, she would be
taxed on the $200,000 of alimony she received. Thus,
$400,000 would be taxed as the state level as though it were
$600,000. Rev. Rul. 2002-22 remedies this situation since
under the Service's analysis only the net amount of $200,000
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would be included in H's gross income, with the remaining
$200,000 includible directly in W's gross income.
In its ruling, the Service concludes that section 1041
can override the assignment of income doctrine. There is
nothing remarkable or controversial about this position. The
problem is that in order for section 1041 to be applicable there
18
must be a transfer of property or rights to property.
The
difficulty with the Service's analysis is that what is being
transferred is the right to receive earned income (i.e. , income
relating to services provided by the taxpayer). It remains to be
seen whether the courts will agree with the Service that this
constitutes a property right within the purview of section 1041.
Compounding this problem is the fact that Congress, by
providing for the inclusion of alimony by the recipient and its
deduction by the payor, has provided a mechanism to shift
earned income between taxpayers.
III. THE DIFFERING TREATMENT OF NON-VESTED v.
VESTED RIGHTS
The Service specifically provided circumstances under
which the ruling would not be applicable. One of these
situations is where, at the time of the transfer, the transferor's
19
rights are unvested or subject to substantial contingencies.
The Service's refusal to extend the treatment it is willing to
accord vested nonqualified deferred compensation or
nonqualified stock options to similar but non-vested situations
raises additional questions.
The impact of the Service's refusal can be illustrated
utilizing the facts set forth above, with one additional fact; that
H's right to the deferred compensation did not vest unless he
remained an employee of the plan sponsor for a period of four
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years following the year in which the deferred compensation
was otherwise earned. Under this circumstance, the Service
would refuse to apply Rev. Rul. 2002-22 and would instead
apply assignment of income principles thus taxing H on the
receipt of the entire payment. H would suffer the adverse
consequences set forth above, which the Service willing
eliminated in the case of vested nonqualified deferred
compensation.
The Service never explained why this
restrictive approach does not frustrate the purpose of section
1041. The Service also did not offer any reason for its decision
to restrict the scope of its ruling in this manner, for example,
what potential abuse did it envision occurring? Instead it relied
on the Ninth Circuit's opinion m Kochansky v.
Commissioner.20
Kochansky is, however, inapposite. At issue in that
case was an attempt by an attorney to transfer to his former
spouse one-half of a net contingency fee from a specific case
that was yet to be resolved. Subsequent to their divorce he
settled the case, and the fee was paid to him and his former
wife consistent with the terms of the divorce decree. The
application of section 1041 was not at issue in Kochansky.
The Service's argument, and the Court's analysis, proceeded
entirely along assignment of income lines. 21
The Service's restncttve position is seemingly
predicated upon its view that a contingent right does not give
rise to property. Query whether this is inconsistent with the
Congressional mandate to construe that term property broadly
when applying section 1041 so as to facilitate transfers incident
to a divorce? Insight into the Service's thought process can
be obtained by examining the exclusion of "other future
income rights" from section 1041 treatment. Indeed that is
precisely the type of income interest addressed by the Ninth
Circuit in Kochansky. A better approach would have been for

2006 I The Transfer ofNonqualified Deferred I 128

129 I Vol. 16 I North East Journal of Legal Studies

the Service to limit the scope of the ruling to deferred
compensation and stock options; while at the same time
making it clear that "other future income rights," whether
vested or non-vested, are outside of the scope of section 1041
where those rights relate to earned income. 22

transferee, the divorce decree should contain language clearly
delineating that the parties intended this result.
IV. CONCLUSION

Within the context of a divorce there is little practical
difference between the a division of a taxpayer's vested right to
receive deferred compensation and a right that will vest
provided the taxpayer continues to be employed by the same
employer for a period of time. Applying the assignment of
income doctrine in either situation would frustrate the purpose
of section 1041. This is especially true given the level of
specificity that the courts have demanded before shifting the
c:
23
burden from the transferor of property to the trans1eree.
Rev.
Rul. 2002-22 notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that a court
will impose the additional burden on the transferee absent a
clear language in the divorce decree that the imposition of this
burden was intended by the parties.
In the case of nonstatutory options, this intent can be
easily established through the actual transfer of said options.
Assuming that the options can be transferred, the absence of an
actual transfer should generally preclude the application of
Rev. Rul. 2002-22. With respect to deferred compensation
arrangements, to the extent that a taxpayer can assign or
transfer his or her rights to said compensation, he or she should
be required to do so before being able to apply the rationale of
the ruling. Thus, the employer should be making payments
directly to the transferee former spouse. The more difficult
situation arises where the plan provides that the taxpayer's
interest in the deferred compensation can not be transferred or
assigned. In that case, payments are made to the employee
who then makes a payment to his former spouse. In order for
transferor to reap the benefit of shifting the tax burden to the

The Service's willingness to permit divorcing spouses
to shift earned income outside the parameters of a traditional
alimony deduction provides taxpayers and their advisors with a
significantly enhanced degree of flexibility. In order to take
advantage of this flexibility it is imperative that the rights and
obligations of the parties be clearly set forth. A court
confronted with determining whether Rev. Rul. 2002-22 should
be applied to shift the incidence of taxation from the transferor
spouse to the transferee spouse should not be left to guess as to
the party's intent. This is particularly important since it is
unclear whether the result reached under Rev. Rul. 2002-22 is
the correct one.

ENDNOTES
1

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). The assignment of income at
issue in Earl arose as a consequence of an agreement entered into
years before the enactment of the income tax in 1913. Thus, there
was no question that tax avoidance motive was not a motivating
factor in the income splitting arrangement.
2

An exception to this general rule is found in Blair v.
Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). Blair involved a situation
wherein the transferor did have any interest in the underlying
property producing the income (i.e, his interest was solely that of an
income beneficiary). The taxpayer assigned a portion of his right to
receive income to a third party. Holding that he transferred a
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portion of everything he had, the Court allowed the transfer and
refused to apply the assignment of income doctrine.

appropriate tax consequences of a property transfer governed by
section 1041.

3

8

See,Helveringv.Horst, 311 U.S.112(1940). Thetransferorneed
not transfer his entire interest in property to another in order to
effectuate an assignment of income; however, that which he transfers
must include an ownership interest in the property itself as opposed
to simply the income to be produced from the property.
4

See,-Section 414(p)

9

2002-IC.B. 849. The Service subsequently has issued Rev. Rul.
2004-60, 2004-24 I.R.B. 1051, which addresses the question of the
appropriate treatment for employment tax purposes of a transfer
within the purview of Rev. Rul. 2002-22.

See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), reh. denied,
312 U.S. 713 (1941), wherein the taxpayer sought to assign the
income from insurance renewal commissions. These commissions
required no further activity by the taxpayer. Despite this, the
renewal commissions did not lose their status as earned income, so
as to allow them to be characterized as property, or fit within the
more liberal approach of Blair. See, note 2, supra.

This represented a reversal of the Service 's previous position, that
the assignment of income doctrine controlled the outcome in this
area. Examples of the Service's more restrictive approach can be
found in FSA 200005006, 2/4/2000 (involving nonstatutory stock
options) and PLR 9340032, 7/06/1993 (involving nonqualified
deferred compensation).

5

II

370 U.S. 65 (1962), reh. denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962). The Davis
opinion complicated matters concerning property settlements by
imposing an additional cost upon the transferor spouse in the form of
a tax liability based upon the appreciation in the assets transferred in
exchange for the transferee spouse's marital rights. This additional
cost, however, was generally a burden only in common law states,
since the joint ownership interest in community property states
eliminated much ofthe problem.

10

"'
uee,
note 8, supra.

12

Congress intended that in applying section 1041, the term
property be broadly construed so as to ease the burden associated
with transfers in connection with a divorce. Balding v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368, 371 (1992); see, also, H.R. Rep. No.
432, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 1491, 1492 (1984)
13

Section 1041 accomplishes this by treating the transfer as a gift
and by providing that the transferee takes a carryover (the
transferor's basis) in the property. See, § 1041 (b)

Under Rev. Rul. 2002-22, the deferred compensation which is
assigned to his former spouse never comes into his income;
therefore, sections 71 and 215 relating to the characterization and
deductibility of alimony are inapplicable.

7

14

6

Also essential to any analysis is a determination of the nature of
the interest transferred in connection with the divorce. That is, was
an interest in property subject to gain or loss transferred, or was the
property being transferred simply the proceeds from the subsequent
sale of the property? See, text accompanying note 23, infra. The
answer to this question is vitally important in determining the

The fact that theW's right to receive the applicable percentage of
H's deferred compensation survives her death would preclude the
treatment ofthe payment of said sum as alimony. See, §71(b).
15

This would be true even ifH received property from his employer
instead of cash. The property would be included in his gross income
at its fair market value and he would take as his basis in said
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property that same amount. Section 1041 would protect both H and
W upon the transfer of the property, and W would take H's basis in
the property. Thus, if W were to immediately sell the property for its
fair market value, W would not recognize any gain or loss.

Kenfieldv. United States, 783 F.2d 966 (10 Cir. 1986) (transfer of a
partnership interest); Schulze v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1983-263
(transfer of an interest in a lawsuit); and Cofield v. Koehler, 207 F.
Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962) (transfer of savings bonds)- did not
involve the transfer of a right to receive earned income. It should be
noted, however, that the lawsuit in Schulze was brought in part to
recover partnership income, but that was but one aspect of the
overall claim assigned to the taxpayer's former spouse. Moreover,
the assignment of the interest in the lawsuit was part of an overall
plan to divide the separately held property of the taxpayer and his
former spouse.

16

The adverse tax effect could be exacerbated if any of the
limitations based upon gross income or adjusted gross income where
triggered. See, e.g. § 165(h)(2) relating to the limitation on the
deductibility of a casualty loss. In addition, H would be liable for
any applicable FICA tax applicable to the $400,000 payment.
17

See, e.g., §71(b) and §71(f)

18

See, §104l(b)

19

The ruling specifically provides that it "does not apply to transfers
of nonstatutory stock options, unfunded deferred compensation
rights, or other future income rights to the extent such options or
rights are unvested at the time of transfer or to the extent that the
transferor's rights to such income are subject to substantial
contingencies at the time of the transfer."
20

92 F.3d 957 (91h Cir. 1996)

21

Based upon the manner in which the case was argued, had the
matter giving rise to the fee been resolved and the taxpayer been
entitled to receive a specific sum certain at the time of the divorce, it
is unlikely that the Service or the Ninth Circuit would have reached a
different result. However, had the taxpayer argued section 1041 and
if the Service is correct, that vested future right to receive income
from services gives rise to property, within the meaning of section
1041, then a division of a fee similar to the one at issue in Kochansky
should be respected.
22

The Service cited a number of pre-section 1041 cases in support
of principle that transfers between divorcing spouses were not
voluntary assignments so as to trigger the application of the
assignment of income doctrine. These cases -- Meisner v. United
States, 133 F.3d 654 (8 Cir. 1998) (transfer of a royalty interest);

23

See, e.g., Balding v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368 (1992) (wife was
not required to include in her income payments received from former
husband in lieu of her share of his military retirement pay); Witcher
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2002-292 (wife had to include portion
of husband's military retirement pay paid directly to her pursuant to
a state court award); Yankwich v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 200237 (court refused to tax transferee spouse on gain from an installment
sale; separation agreement did not transfer beneficial interest in the
obligation to the transferee); Weir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2001-184 (transferor spouse taxed on receipt of payments made to
her by her former husband; payments treated as former husband's
military pension in light of clear language in the agreement); Suhr v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2001-28 (court ordered award of one-half
of the proceeds from the sale of a house did not constitute an award
to him of an ownership interest in the property); Urbauer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1997-227 (court refused to tax transferee
spouse on gain from sale of house; transferee did not acquire a
beneficial interest in the house by virtue of her interest in the sales
proceeds); Friscone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-193 (while
legal title to shares of stock was not transferred , the divorce decree
left no doubt that there was a transfer of the beneficial ownership of
the stock).

